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NOTES
Nonconsensual Pornography and the First
Amendment: A Case for a New Unprotected
Category of Speech
ALIX IRIS COHEN*
Nonconsensual pornography, or the distribution of sexually
graphic images of individuals without their consent, is not
illegal at the federal level, nor is it illegal in the majority of
states. Failure to pass laws prohibiting nonconsensual pornography, commonly referred to as “revenge porn,” leaves
many victims without recourse. Opponents of legislation
regulating revenge porn claim that it cannot be banned because it constitutes speech that is protected by the First
Amendment. This Comment argues that nonconsensual pornography should be considered an unprotected category of
speech, which would enable it to be prohibited without triggering First Amendment concerns. The method of regulating
revenge porn (i.e., through particular torts or criminal prohibitions) is beyond the scope of this Comment; instead, it
focuses on why this speech should be unprotected, opening
the door for legislatures to regulate it as they see fit.
Nonconsensual pornography should not be protected by the
First Amendment because of its similarities to existing unprotected categories of speech: namely, public disclosure of
*
BA 2013, New York University; JD Candidate 2016, University of Miami
School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Caroline Mala Corbin for her invaluable support, feedback, and assistance throughout the writing of this Comment.
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private fact, defamation, and child pornography. Part I presents the three theories often articulated for why the First
Amendment protects speech: to create a marketplace of
ideas, facilitate participatory democracy, and promote individual autonomy. Part II explains why certain types of
speech are unprotected: because their minimal value towards advancing these free speech goals is outweighed by
the significant harm they cause. Part III discusses three current unprotected categories: public disclosure of private
fact, defamation, and child pornography. For each, it explains why they have been found to be unprotected - balancing their contribution to promoting free speech values
against the harms they cause. Part IV argues for revenge
porn as a new unprotected category, first defining the parameters of the category, discussing what the category
should encompass in order to ensure it is not overbroad. It
then highlights nonconsensual pornography’s low free
speech value and analogous harms to the existing three categories—showing it is indistinguishable from speech that
has already been deemed unprotected.
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INTRODUCTION
A human trafficking victim testified that her former pimp, Alex
Campbell, forced her to have sex with another woman while he videotaped her and then threatened to send the video to her family if
she did not “come back into his grasp.”1 A high school teacher’s exboyfriend allegedly accessed his email account and sent naked photos of the teacher to 287 of his students and staff after the two broke
up.2 A woman’s ex-boyfriend posted a topless photo of her on her
employer’s Facebook page, accompanied by a message calling her
a “drunk” and a “slut.”3
While each of these perpetrators may be prosecuted on other
grounds (i.e., for human trafficking),4 the underlying act—the distribution of nonconsensual pornography—is not illegal in many
states.5 Failure to pass laws prohibiting nonconsensual pornography
leaves many victims without recourse.6 Nonconsensual pornography, often referred to as revenge porn (used interchangeably
1

Marion Brooks, The World of Human Trafficking: One Woman’s Story,
NBC CHICAGO (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/human-trafficking-alex-campbell-192415731.html.
2
Andy Campbell, Jilted Ex-Boyfriend Sends Nude Photos of Teacher To
Students, Staff: Police, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/04/richard-rosa-david-galvan_n_6099464.html.
3
Office of the City Attorney for the City of Los Angeles, Press Release:
City Attorney Feuer Secures Conviction Under State’s “Revenge Porn” Law
(Dec. 1, 2014), http://freepdfhosting.com/b9b7570cb1.pdf.
4
See Brooks, supra note 1.
5
See Mary Anne Franks, Drafting an Effective “Revenge Porn” Law: A
Guide for Legislators, ENDREVENGEPORN.ORG (July 18, 2014),
http://www.endrevengeporn.org/main_2013/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Guidefor-Legislators_7-18-14.pdf.
6
See, e.g., Erin Donaghue, Judge Throws Out New York ‘Revenge Porn’
Case, CBS NEWS (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-throwsout-new-york-revenge-porn-case/ (New York judge ruled that a man who posted
nude photos of his ex-girlfriend on Twitter and sent them to her employer and
sister, allegedly without the woman’s consent, did not violate any existing criminal law); see also Amanda L. Cecil, Taking Back the Internet: Imposing Civil
Liability on Interactive Computer Services in an Attempt to Provide an Adequate
Remedy to Victims of Nonconsensual Pornography, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
2513, 2517 (2014) (Court of Appeals of Texas held class action suit against webhosting company for displaying nude images of women on one of their web sites
without the women’s consent should be dismissed because publishing images
taken by a third party is not illegal); see also Annmarie Chiarini, I Was a Victim
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throughout this Comment), is the “distribution of sexually graphic
images of individuals without their consent.”7 The images include
those originally taken without consent and those initially taken with
consent—most often within a private relationship—and then distributed to others without consent.8 Revenge porn is commonly posted
online by “ex-boyfriends, ex-husbands and ex-lovers, often accompanied by disparaging descriptions and identifying details, like
where the women live and work, as well as links to their Facebook
pages.”9 Once online, the images spread—often “picked up by dozens or even hundreds of other Web sites.”10 These images, exposing
individuals’ most private aspects of themselves, are often published
to perpetrate abuse, to embarrass, or to shame.11
While prior to 2013, only three states—New Jersey, Alaska, and
Texas—had laws criminalizing nonconsensual pornography, ten
states passed laws in 2013 and 2014, and legislation has been introduced or is pending in eighteen other states, as well as in Washington D.C. and Puerto Rico.12 However, many state proposals and federal legislation have faced opposition from critics arguing that such
laws infringe on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s protection of free speech.13 A bill addressing the issue in Florida, for
of Revenge Porn. I Don’t Want Anyone Else to Face This, THE GUARDIAN (Nov.
19, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/19/revengeporn-victim-maryland-law-change (When Chiarini’s ex-boyfriend auctioned a
CD of 88 naked images of her on eBay without her consent, the Baltimore County
police told her there was nothing they could do because “[n]o crime had been
committed.”).
7
Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn,
49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014).
8
Id.
9
Erica Goode, Victims Push Laws to End Online Revenge Posts, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/us/victims-push-laws-toend-online-revenge-posts.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
10
Id.
11
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 1–3.
12
As of the time this Comment was written. Franks, supra note 5, at 2.
13
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech. . . .”); see also Erin Fuchs, Here’s What the Constitution Says
About Posting Naked Pictures of Your Ex To The Internet, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 1,
2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/is-revenge-porn-protected-by-the-firstamendment-2013-9; Steven Nelson, Federal ‘Revenge Porn’ Bill Will Seek to
Shrivel Booming Internet Fad, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/03/26/federal-revenge-porn-bill-will-seek-to-
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instance, failed in the state’s legislature in 2013, in part because of
First Amendment concerns.14 Under the First Amendment, speech
is not limited to spoken words, but also covers other forms of expression—including images.15 Thus, laws that ban or criminalize the
distribution of images may raise free speech questions.
This Comment argues that nonconsensual pornography should
be considered an unprotected category of speech, which would enable it to be prohibited without triggering First Amendment concerns.16 The method of regulating nonconsensual pornography (i.e.,
through particular torts or criminal prohibitions) is beyond the scope
of this Comment; instead, this Comment focuses on why nonconsensual pornography should be unprotected, opening the door for
legislatures to regulate it as they see fit.
Arguably, distributing nonconsensual pornography should be
considered conduct, not speech, because nonconsensual pornography is generally disseminated to cause harm, rather than to express
an idea.17 Moreover, there are many laws regulating conduct that
may be considered speech, but are not thought to trigger the First
Amendment—i.e., perjury, extortion, placing bets, etc.18 However,
assuming nonconsensual pornography (as defined above) is speech,

shrivel-booming-internet-fad (revealing that commentators claim federal legislation introduced to criminalize online dissemination of nonconsensual pornography raises First Amendment issues).
14
Clay Calvert, Revenge Porn and Freedom of Expression: Legislative
Pushback to an Online Weapon of Emotional and Reputational Destruction, 24
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 693–94 (2014).
15
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986
DUKE L.J. 589, 594 (noting that adult pornography is generally considered protected speech under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause).
16
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19–20 (1971) (explaining that if a
category of speech is established as unprotected, it can be regulated without regard
to the First Amendment).
17
See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11 (1974) (Conduct is considered speech covered by the First Amendment if the speaker intends to convey
a particular message, and “in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”). If the distributor’s intent is to harm, it is not necessarily to convey a message, nor necessarily understood by viewers as conveying a message.
18
Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270 (1981).
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it should be unprotected by the First Amendment because of its similarities to existing unprotected categories of speech: namely, public
disclosure of private fact,19 defamation,20 and child pornography.21
Part I presents the three theories often articulated for why the
First Amendment protects speech: to create a marketplace of ideas,
facilitate participatory democracy, and promote individual autonomy. Part II explains why certain types of speech are unprotected:
because their minimal value towards advancing these free speech
goals is outweighed by the significant harm they cause. Part III discusses three current unprotected categories: public disclosure of private fact, defamation, and child pornography. For each, it explains
why they have been found to be unprotected—balancing their contribution to promoting free speech values against the harms they
cause. Part IV argues for revenge porn as a new unprotected category, first defining the parameters of the category and discussing
what the category should encompass in order to ensure it is not
overly broad.22 It then highlights nonconsensual pornography’s low
free speech value and analogous harms to the existing three categories—showing it is indistinguishable from speech that has already
been deemed unprotected.
I. WHY SPEECH IS PROTECTED
There are three predominant theories for why freedom of speech
is protected under the First Amendment: (1) to create a marketplace
19

Publication of Private Facts, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT,
http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/publication-private-facts (last visited July 29,
2015).
20
Frequently Asked Questions—Speech, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/faq/frequently-asked-questions-speech
(last visited July 29, 2015).
21
Id.
22
Some revenge porn laws go too far in infringing upon speech. See, e.g.,
First Amendment Lawsuit Challenges Arizona Criminal Law Banning Nude Images, ACLU (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/free-speech/first-amendment-lawsuit-challenges-arizona-criminal-law-banning-nude-images (A coalition of bookstores, news media, librarians, and photographers challenged an Arizona “nude photo law” for being overbroad in criminalizing speech protected by
the First Amendment.). However, a narrow range of nonconsensual pornography
should be considered unprotected speech in order to allow for criminal or civil
legal remedies for nonconsensual pornography victims.
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of ideas; (2) to enhance participatory democracy; and (3) to promote
individual autonomy and self-expression.23 While some may be emphasized in certain cases over others, all three have been used by the
Supreme Court to justify the protection of speech.24
A.
Marketplace of Ideas
Justice Holmes wrote, “the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas . . . the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. . . . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”25 This
articulates the theory that by protecting freedom of speech, the Constitution fosters a marketplace of ideas by allowing different viewpoints to be expressed.26 Doing so promotes the search for truth because there is a greater change that the truth will be revealed if different ideas are expressed.27
Under this theory, false ideas are useful because by challenging
true ideas, they encourage re-examination of the truth, strengthening
and vitalizing the truth.28 Discussion of both true and false ideas is
necessary to discover which the falsities are; thus, “the remedy to be
applied [to overcome falsehood] is more speech, not enforced silence.”29
The marketplace of ideas theory has been criticized because in
reality, truth does not always prevail over falsehood.30 For instance,
inequality among communicators in the marketplace of ideas—i.e.,
the fact that social and economic power largely determine who has
control of channels of communication—affects what messages are
heard.31 In addition, people’s tendency to interpret information in a
23

Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 966 (2009).
24
See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24–26 (alluding to all three theories as reasons for
finding that wearing a jacket stating “Fuck the draft” is protected speech).
25
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
26
See id.
27
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964).
28
See Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119,
130 (1989).
29
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
30
See Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 132–34.
31
See id. at 134.

308

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:300

way that conforms with social convention or serves individuals’ interests or unconscious desires may color their understanding of
truth.32
However, the alternative to protecting a free marketplace of
ideas is regulation by the government. Giving the state power to
control which ideas are heard sparks the fear underlying the Free
Speech Clause: that government regulation will be driven by a desire
of those in power to only allow dissemination of ideas in support of
themselves and the policies they favor (contrary to promoting participatory democracy, discussed below).33 Indeed, “it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in
this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so
largely to the individual.”34
B.
Participatory Democracy
Freedom of speech facilitates democratic government in at least
two ways: (1) it makes having an informed electorate possible by
ensuring access to information; and (2) it encourages participation
in the democratic process by enabling people to express their political views.35
First, because in a democracy the electorate votes government
officials into power, citizens need as much information as possible
to elect the best-suited political officials.36 Free speech enables the
media to report a wide variety of viewpoints on political candidates
and public affairs, including “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”37 This
facilitates democracy by providing the electorate with information
and different opinions on the government, in order for it to effectively assess candidates’ performances.38
32

Id. at 134–35.
Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37
CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 632 (2004).
34
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
35
Corbin, supra note 23, at 969.
36
See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591,
596 (1982).
37
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (limiting the
scope of defamation against public officials to protect the media’s ability to contribute to “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” public debate).
38
See Redish, supra note 36, at 596.
33
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Second, protecting speech encourages participation in the democratic process by enabling people to voice their own opinions about
their government and political officials, even if those opinions are
critical.39 Democracy is based not only on the election of political
officials, but also on a culture of participation in government—often
through speech regarding political affairs.40 The value of this democratic culture is that “it gives ordinary people a say in the progress
and development of the cultural forces that in turn produce them.”41
Voicing ideas may also be influential in other people’s voting decisions and in the legislature’s policy choices.42
C.
Individual Autonomy
Because free speech affords people an opportunity to hear and
consider different ideas as well as to voice their own opinions, it
promotes autonomy.43 Autonomy “consists of a person’s authority
(or right) to make decisions about herself . . . as long as her actions
do not block others’ similar authority or rights.”44 The autonomy
advanced by freedom of expression includes self-realization, or independent thought, and self-determination, or independent decisionmaking.45
First, self-realization refers “to development of the individual’s
powers and abilities”—an individual’s power to realize his or her
own potential.46 This is tied to free speech because people define
themselves by expressing their thoughts through speech.47 For instance, speech encompasses self-expressive rights, such as the right
to persuade or associate with others, or on the contrary, to criticize

39

See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 417–18 (1989) (upholding
a right to burn the American flag as a form of free speech because it is expression
of a particular political idea).
40
Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 35 (2004).
41
Id.
42
See id. at 35–36.
43
Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 143.
44
C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251,
254 (2011).
45
See Greenawalt, supra 28, at 143–44.
46
Redish, supra note 36, at 593.
47
See Baker, supra note 44, at 253–54.
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or disassociate with others.48 These forms of expression help individuals define who they are based on who and what they like, as
well as who and what they dislike.49
Second, self-determination refers to “the individual’s control of
his or her own destiny through making life-affecting decisions”—
an individual’s ability to achieve the life goals that he or she has
set.50 The ability to think and speak freely enables individuals to
make decisions autonomously, both because of the link between
freedom of speech and freedom of thought,51 and because free
speech ensures access to information needed for one to make informed decisions.52 Government interference with freedom of
speech denies individuals the right to hear an idea and deprives them
of the ability to obtain information necessary for making independent decisions.53 Thus, limiting free speech “interferes with free
choice, and therefore with the exercise of autonomy.”54
II. DETERMINING CATEGORIES OF UNPROTECTED SPEECH
While these three theories underlying free speech are compelling, the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, like most constitutional rights, is not absolute.55 If speech is protected under the
First Amendment, and a state regulates it, the state regulation must
be subjected to some type of heightened scrutiny.56 However, certain narrowly defined classes of speech are unprotected by the First

48

Id. at 254.
See id.
50
Redish, supra note 36, at 593.
51
Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 144–45.
52
See Balkin, supra note 40, at 36.
53
See Baker, supra note 44, at 254.
54
Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 150.
55
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
56
See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (applying strict
scrutiny to a federal law prohibiting a particular type of lie because false statements are protected speech under the First Amendment); contra Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 573–74 (upholding a state law prohibiting “fighting words” without applying any kind of heightened scrutiny because such speech is unprotected).
49
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Amendment because the “prevention and punishment of [such classes] has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”57
Regulations restricting these types of speech are not subject to
heightened scrutiny.58 These include obscenity, libel, and “fighting”
words, for instance.59
A.
Balancing Test
Determining whether speech is protected “involves weighing the
free speech interests involved in a particular case against other countervailing interests, such as the public or state interests in order and
security and the interests in deferring to legislative judgment.”60 Essentially, courts weigh how much the type of speech contributes to
free speech values against the harm the speech causes.61 If the harm
caused is great, and the speech contributes only minimally to the
underlying purposes of the First Amendment (creating a marketplace of ideas, facilitating participatory democracy, or advancing
autonomy), it may be deemed an unprotected category.62
For example, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme
Court found “fighting words”—or words which “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace”—to be an unprotected category of speech.63 Fighting words
have minimal free speech value because they are personal epithets,
not an “exposition of ideas” that contribute to the marketplace or to
participatory democracy.64 While they may have slight value in

57

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72. There is, however, one exception to the
general rule that unprotected categories of speech do not raise constitutional concerns: even if speech is unprotected, regulations of such speech cannot discriminate based on a specific viewpoint. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
383–91 (1992).
58
See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–74.
59
Id. at 572.
60
Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”:
An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899,
904 (1979).
61
See id. at 904–05.
62
See id. at 910–11.
63
315 U.S. at 572.
64
See id. The fighting words spoken by the appellant in this case, for example, were “You are a God damned racketeer . . . a damned Fascist and the whole
government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists . . . ” Id. at 569.
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terms of autonomy of the speaker, who is expressing his or her hatred or desire to attack the listener, they have no value for the autonomy of the listener, who is subjected to a personal insult.65 In addition, fighting words cause severe harm because by definition, they
insult the listener and pose a safety risk to society, as they are likely
to provoke retaliation, causing breach of the peace.66
B.
Reluctance to Declare New Categories
Generally, pornography is protected speech to the extent that the
sexually explicit images neither constitute obscenity nor child pornography.67 The question of whether nonconsensual pornography is
protected speech, however, has not yet been before the Supreme
Court. In Revenge Porn and Freedom of Expression, Clay Calvert
argues that the Supreme Court is unlikely to designate nonconsensual pornography as a new category of unprotected speech, due to
its reluctance to find new classes of speech unprotected in recent
cases.68 In United States v. Stevens, Brown v. Entm’t Merchants
Ass’n, and United States v. Alvarez, for instance, the Court declined
to identify new categories of unprotected speech for depictions of
animal cruelty, violent images directed at children, and lies, respectively.69
In Alvarez, the plurality took a slightly different approach to determining unprotected categories. Rather than applying the traditional test—balancing the free speech benefits against the harms of
the speech—the Court insisted on a historical analysis.70 Justice
Kennedy wrote, “[b]efore exempting a category of speech from the
normal prohibition on content-based restrictions . . . the Court must
be presented with ‘persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on
content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of

65

See id. at 572.
See id.
67
See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 594.
68
Calvert, supra note 14, at 683.
69
Id. at 683–84 (discussing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010);
Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011); United States v. Alvarez,
132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)).
70
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012).
66
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proscription.’”71 Although, as Calvert writes, revenge porn is a “new
form of expression for which there is no historical lack of protection,”72 its minimal benefits and severe harms closely parallel those
of child pornography, defamation, and public disclosure of private
fact—all of which are historically unprotected speech.73
Moreover, nonconsensual pornography should be distinguished
from false statements at issue in Alvarez because false statements
were historically protected speech;74 revenge porn, however, did not
exist prior to the invention of the Internet, the predominant tool used
to distribute nonconsensual pornography. Thus, because revenge
porn inherently is not part of a “tradition of proscription,” lack of
historical roots should not prevent it from being identified as an unprotected category.75 In addition, an originalist analysis should not
be used for determining classes of unprotected speech because the
Founders had a more limited view of the Free Speech Clause than
the general view today.76 Nevertheless, even under a historical approach, revenge porn should not be precluded from being deemed
unprotected because its similarities to historically unprotected
speech make it more like a reconfiguration of existing categories,
rather than an entirely new one.77

71

Id. (Kennedy, J., plurality) (finding false statements should not constitute
a new category of unprotected speech on this historical basis) (internal citation
omitted).
72
Calvert, supra note 14, at 684.
73
See Sheppard Liu, Ashcroft, Virtual Child Pornography, and First Amendment Jurisprudence, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2007); Frequently
Asked Questions—Speech, supra note 20; Publication of Private Facts, supra note
19.
74
See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547.
75
See id. at 2547.
76
Michael Kahn, The Origination and Early Development of Free Speech in
the United States, 76 FLA. B.J. 71, 71 (2002). The original understanding of the
clause excepted broad categories of speech as not being protected, including
speech that was “blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or
scandalous libels.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
77
Nonconsensual pornography would likely be considered to fall within the
scope of historically unprotected “immoral” or “scandalous” speech. See id.
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III. CURRENT UNPROTECTED CATEGORIES OF SPEECH
Nonconsensual pornography is closely analogous to three current unprotected categories of speech: public disclosure of private
fact, defamation, and child pornography.78 Like each of these classes
of speech, discussed below, nonconsensual pornography should not
be protected because it does not advance the marketplace of ideas,
participatory democracy, or individual autonomy, and it causes significant harm in many of the same ways these unprotected categories
do.
A.

Public Disclosure of Private Fact

1. DEFINITION
Although the cause of action for public disclosure of private fact
differs state by state, the elements of the tort generally include: (1)
the public disclosure, (2) of a private fact, (3) that would be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person, and (4) that is not of
legitimate public concern.79 Unlike defamation, public disclosure of
private fact “does not rest upon the inaccuracy of the statement but
upon the unwanted publicity” resulting from the statement.80
a. Public Disclosure
The disclosure of a private fact is public if the communication is
made to a large or “potentially large” group of people.81 Public disclosure is considered to occur both when the communicator distributes the private information to the large group of people himself or
herself, as well as when the communicator “merely initiates the process whereby the information is eventually disclosed to a large number of persons.”82 The private fact may be disclosed through a variety of means, including oral or written communications, video, or
still photographs.83
78

See Liu, supra note 73 at 2; Frequently Asked Questions—Speech, supra
note 20; Publication of Private Facts, supra note 19.
79
Richard E. Kaye, Invasion of Privacy By Public Disclosure of Private
Facts, 103 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 159, § 2 (2014).
80
Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1969).
81
Kaye, supra note 79, at § 3.
82
Id.
83
Id.
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For instance, in Kinsey v. Macur, the defendant, Macur, previously had a sexual relationship with the plaintiff, Kinsey, before
Kinsey was married.84 After their relationship ended, Macur mailed
several harassing letters to Kinsey, his new wife, and their acquaintances disclosing private facts concerning Kinsey’s character, including that Kinsey had been accused of murdering his first wife,
spent six months in jail for that crime, and had marijuana in his
apartment.85 Although these letters were mailed to roughly twenty
people, the court still held it was sufficient publicity to justify finding the plaintiff’s privacy had been invaded.86
In addition, although the plaintiff had shared most of the facts
disclosed with Macur at some time, Macur’s publicizing these facts
to about twenty others was still an invasion of privacy.87 The court
noted, “much of the outrage underlying the asserted right to privacy
is a reaction to exposure to persons known only through business or
other secondary relationships. The claim is not so much one of total
secrecy as it is the right to define one’s circle of intimacy.”88 In other
words, it is not the number of people to whom the fact is disclosed
that constitutes the primary harm, but the fact that the person whose
privacy was invaded was unable to choose with whom the information was shared.89
b. Private Fact
To be considered private, the facts disclosed must not already be
a matter of public record; there must be some reasonable expectation
of privacy in the facts.90 Facts that have previously been considered

84

165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 609–610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
Id. at 610. Kinsey had in fact been charged with the murder of his first wife
and spent six months awaiting trial, so these statements were not defamatory. See
id. at 609. While Kinsey had disclosed the former two facts to Macur, he had not
disclosed other facts in the letters (including those regarding his prior drug use)
to Macur. Id. at 610. He concluded she found out about his marijuana possession
by breaking into his apartment. Id.
86
Id. at 611–612.
87
See id. at 612.
88
Id.
89
See id.
90
Kaye, supra note 79, at § 4.
85
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private include information about intimate parts of a person’s anatomy and images of sexual acts.91
In Banks v. King Features Syndicate, for example, a woman’s
doctors turned over a copy of an X-ray of her pelvic region—without her consent—to a newspaper reporter.92 The reporter passed the
X-ray picture to King Features Syndicate, Inc., which published an
article about a medical issue afflicting the plaintiff.93 The article and
X-ray were published in a newspaper and circulated throughout the
U.S.94 No claim was made that the article or X-ray picture were
false; however, by publishing the X-ray, which depicted details of
the woman’s anatomy, her right to privacy was violated.95
The court in Banks defined privacy as “the right of an individual
to be let alone or to live a life of seclusion, or to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the
public about matters with which the public is not necessarily concerned.”96 Although the article was describing medical malpractice
inflicted on the plaintiff—arguably an issue of public concern—the
image of the most intimate details of her body was private.97
Moreover, in Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, the
court granted a preliminary injunction to prevent the dissemination
of a videotape depicting famous rock star Bret Michaels and actress
Pamela Anderson Lee engaging in sexual intercourse.98 The court
stated that “distribution of the Tape on the Internet would constitute
public disclosure,” and “the content of the Tape—Michaels and Lee
engaged in sexual relations—constitutes a set of private facts,” the

91

See Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939);
see also Michaels v. Internet Ent. Grp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
92
Banks, 30 F. Supp. at 353.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
See id. at 353–54. The court in Banks, however, deferred determination of
the motion before it until trial because whether the act constituted a violation of
the plaintiff’s right to privacy depended on state law. Id. at 354. Because the
pleadings were ambiguous as to which state King Features “broke the seal of privacy and made public the plaintiff’s name and X-ray picture” in, it was unclear
under which state’s law the defendant would be held liable. Id.
98
5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 828 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
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disclosure of which “would be objectionable to a reasonable person.”99 The court rejected the defendant’s argument that because
Lee had appeared nude in magazines, movies, and publicly distributed videotapes, the content of the tape was no longer private.100
“The fact that she has performed a role involving sex, does not, however, make her real sex life open to the public.”101 Furthermore, even
though a different videotape disclosing sexual relations between Lee
and her husband Tommy Lee had previously been made public, that
disclosure did not justify disclosing a sex tape between Lee and
Michaels: “Sexual relations are among the most personal and intimate of acts. . . . public exposure of one sexual encounter [does not]
forever remove[] a person’s privacy interest in all subsequent and
previous sexual encounters.”102
Although the plaintiffs in Michaels are public figures who threw
themselves into the public spotlight by seeking fame, and therefore
must tolerate some public exposure of their romantic involvement,
the “visual and aural details of their sexual relations” are “facts
which are ordinarily considered private even for celebrities.”103 This
set of facts surrounding their intimate sexual relations remains private—despite their chosen fame, and despite prior dissemination of
a different sexual videotape featuring Lee.104 Thus, in determining
whether public disclosure of private fact is unprotected speech,
whether it is considered “private” turns not on the status of the figure, but on the nature of the fact.105

99

Id. at 840.
Id.
101
Id. Similar reasoning should apply to the nude photos of celebrities hacked
in 2014. See Amanda Remling, iCloud Nude Leaks: 26 Celebrities Affected in the
Nude Photo Scandal, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2014),
http://www.ibtimes.com/icloud-nude-leaks-26-celebrities-affected-nude-photoscandal-1692540.
102
Michaels, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 840.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
See id.
100
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2. FREE SPEECH VALUE
The private facts tort has been challenged on constitutional
grounds for restricting speech protected under the First Amendment.106 The Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on the conflict between the tort and the First Amendment, leaving the parameters of what speech is unprotected unclear.107 However, generally,
if the private fact is not on a matter of public concern, it is not protected by the First Amendment.108 This rule, expressed in the fourth
element of the tort—that the private facts must not be on a matter of
“legitimate public concern”—indicates the minimal free speech
value of this form of expression.109
a. Marketplace of Ideas
Courts have defined whether a private fact is of legitimate public
interest based on whether it is “newsworthy,” or has some public
importance.110 How newsworthiness is defined varies by jurisdiction. In California, for example, there is a three-prong test that considers “1) the social use of the published facts; 2) the extent of the
article’s encroachment into seemingly private affairs; and 3) the extent to which the victim consented to a position of public fame.”111
The Restatement (Second) of Torts approach, adopted by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, provides that if “the publicity exceeds the
community’s sense of decency,” it cannot be of legitimate public
concern.112 In other words, “if a reasonable person would find the
disclosed facts so indecent as to exceed the promulgation of information to which the community is entitled, then that disclosure is
not of legitimate public concern.”113

106
John A. Jurata, Jr., The Tort That Refuses To Go Away: The Subtle
Reemergence of Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489,
498 (1999).
107
Id. at 498, 502.
108
See Whitney Kirsten McBride, Lock the Closet Door: Does Private Mean
Secret?, 42 MCGEORGE L. Rev. 901, 914–15 (2011).
109
See Kaye, supra note 79, at § 2.
110
See McBride, supra note 108, at 914.
111
Jurata, supra note 106, at 506–07.
112
Id. at 502–03.
113
Id. at 503.
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Under the California test, speech that discloses private facts contributes little to the marketplace of ideas because the marketplace of
ideas concerns discovery of broader societal truths, rather than intimate details of an individual’s private life.114 Under the Restatement’s “decency” test, exposure of an “indecent” fact also contributes little to the marketplace of ideas because it does not advance
the discovery of any truth pertinent to the public interest, i.e. artistic,
literary, academic, or political truth.115
b. Participatory Democracy
If a private fact does not relate to a legitimate public concern,
which would include political candidates or public affairs, it is not
“newsworthy” and is also unlikely to advance participatory democracy.116 For instance, in Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Supreme Court
held that a newspaper printing the name of a rape victim through a
publicly released police report was in the public interest.117 The
name was newsworthy because the information was about “a matter
of public significance”—a crime report.118
This protected speech, which makes some contribution to participatory democracy by, for instance, showing crime levels under
the current regime, stands in stark contrast to speech that has been
determined not newsworthy—such as the sex tape in Michaels,
which had essentially no impact on political affairs or any legitimate
public value.119
c. Individual Autonomy
Public disclosure of a private fact also contributes little to individual autonomy, because the third element, which requires the fact
to be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person, implies that
114

See discussion supra Section I.A. (discussing the marketplace of ideas).
Cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (advocating for freedom to express opinions, such as using language “intended to incite, provoke and encourage resistance to the United States,”
as opposed to publicly disclosing private facts).
116
See discussion supra Section I.B. (discussing participatory democracy).
117
491 U.S. 524, 532–37 (1989).
118
Id. at 536–37.
119
See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 840 (C.D.
Cal. 1998).
115
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publishing the fact would hinder, not advance, the autonomy of the
plaintiff. Even if this speech marginally advances the autonomy of
the defendant, who arguably is expressing himself or herself by publishing the fact, it diminishes the autonomy of the victim, who now
is unable to exercise self-determination in controlling who has access to information about his or her private life.120 In Kinsey, for
example, although writing the letters about Kinsey’s former drug
use may have advanced Macur’s self-expression, it diminished Kinsey’s autonomy by not enabling him to control whether and when
that information would be expressed to the recipients of the letters.121
3. HARM
Public disclosure of private fact is unprotected speech because
its minimal free speech value is outweighed by the severe harm it
causes.122 As discussed above, although it may slightly advance the
autonomy of the speaker,123 it diminishes the autonomy of the individual whom the fact is about124 and fails to contribute to the marketplace of ideas125 or advance participatory democracy.126 Yet by
disclosing the fact, the publisher may inflict severe psychological
harm on victims by humiliating them or damaging their reputation.127 Disclosing the fact also infringes on victims’ sense of security by invading their privacy and diminishing their ability to control
the release of information about themselves.128
Because public disclosure of private fact is defined as requiring
that the disclosure of the fact be objectionable to a reasonable per-

120

See discussion supra Section I.C. (discussing individual autonomy).
See Kinsey v. Macur, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
122
See Kaye, supra note 79, at § 2.
123
See discussion supra Section III.A.2.c. (discussing the speaker’s autonomy
when publicly disclosing private facts).
124
See id.
125
See discussion supra Section III.A.2.a. (discussing how public disclosure
of private fact does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas).
126
See discussion supra Section III.A.2.b. (discussing how public disclosure
of private fact does not advance participatory democracy).
127
M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1131
(2011).
128
See Kinsey v. Macur, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
121
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son, this speech by definition inflicts harm on the person whose privacy is invaded.129 In Kinsey, the Court awarded the plaintiff damages including “mental anguish, suffering, expenses incurred in trying to remove himself and his wife from Macur’s reach, and to protect his wife’s security and ensure her peace of mind.”130 Similarly,
in Banks, the plaintiff asserted that she had “been caused to suffer
humiliation, agony and loss of social prestige by this publicity.”131
Both cases highlight the direct psychological harm endured from
such a violation of privacy, as well as the embarrassment and loss
of security that results from being unable to control the disclosure
of private information.
The harm is comparable to that of a Fourth Amendment privacy
violation, an unreasonable search or seizure, in that it results from
interference with one’s reasonable expectation of privacy.132 Invasion of privacy causes a lack of personal sense of security, which
may cause anxiety, embarrassment, or fear.133 The more privacy is
infringed upon—the more “we might limit what we think and
say.”134 This is because as privacy decreases, the risk that our speech
will be made public increases, so we tailor our speech to be suitable
for a public audience.135 Thus, it is not prohibiting speech disclosing
private facts that risks chilling free speech, but in fact, the opposite:
allowing privacy to be repeatedly invaded is what ultimately would
stop people from speaking freely, thus diminishing ideas in the marketplace, hindering participatory democracy, and reducing autonomy. To protect future speech in furtherance of these First Amendment values, private facts must be able to remain private.

129

See Kaye, supra note 79, at § 9 (The third element of the tort is that disclosing the fact would be “offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person.”).
130
Kinsey, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608 at 614.
131
Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
132
See Kaye, supra note 79, at § 9.
133
See Calo, supra note 127, at 1131.
134
Id. at 1146.
135
See id.
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Defamation

1. DEFINITION
At common law, defamation consists of the “unprivileged publication of false and defamatory statements concerning a plaintiff.”136 Defamation refers to two torts: libel and slander.137 If the
false defamatory statement is written, it is libel; if oral, it is slander.138 The standard for whether defamation is unprotected speech
differs depending on whether the defamatory statements target a
public or private figure.139
a. Public Figure
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court changed
the standard for defamation when the false defamatory statement
targets public officials, rather than private figures.140 Speech defaming a public official is unprotected only if it is made with “actual
malice,” meaning that it is made with actual knowledge that the
statement is false or with reckless disregard for its falsity.141 Without
requiring actual malice, any time a newspaper were to make a mistake about a fact defaming a public figure, it would be held liable
for damages.142 This might cause newspapers to self-censor in order
to avoid making mistakes, chilling accurate criticism of public officials.143 Because protecting criticism of public officials is a core
goal of the Free Speech Clause,144 the balance of free speech benefits and harms is different regarding public officials: the value to the

136

Arien W. Langvardt, Free Speech Versus Economic Harm: Accommodating Defamation, Commercial Speech, and Unfair Competition Considerations in
the Law of Injurious Falsehood, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 903, 907 (1989).
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
See id. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–82 (1964).
140
Id. at 279–80.
141
Id.
142
See id. at 271–72.
143
See id. (“Erroneous statement[s] [are] inevitable in free debate,
and . . . must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing
space’ that they ‘need to survive. . . .’”) (quoting NAACP. v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 433 (1963)).
144
See discussion supra Sections I.A–B.
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marketplace of ideas and participatory democracy outweighs the
harms, unlike in defamation of private figures.145
The Supreme Court has expanded the Sullivan standard to apply
not just to public officials, but also to public figures, including individuals such as a university football coach and a retired general.146
The “actual malice” standard applies to public figures because like
public officials, they may command a substantial amount of public
interest, and are therefore likely to be involved in issues the public
has a justified and important interest in.147 However, “public figure”
has been defined narrowly, and does not include those who have
become famous without thrusting themselves into public controversy to influence others.148
b. Private Figure
The standard for defamation does not require actual malice for
private individuals because the harms are greater for private figures:
they have less access to channels of communication to rebut false
statements about them and are therefore more vulnerable to injury
than public figures.149 The free speech benefits of allowing defamation against private figures is also lower: there is less of a concern
about chilling free speech regarding criticism of private figures, as
this speech contributes less to participatory democracy and the marketplace of ideas, unlike criticism of public officials.150
If individuals become public figures because they have “thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved,” they are a
limited purpose public figure.151 These individuals become public

145

See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.
See Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967).
147
Id.
148
See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (holding that a scientist
whose research on monkeys was publicly attacked was not a public figure for
defamation purposes); see also Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157
(1979) (holding that Russian spies’ nephew, active in public affairs, was not a
public figure because he did not voluntarily thrust himself into controversy).
149
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342–44 (1974).
150
See id. at 344–45.
151
Id. at 345, 351–52.
146
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figures for the “limited range of issues” related to those controversies.152
For example, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, a wealthy industrial
family brought a libel suit against Time magazine for printing false
and defamatory reports about the husband and wife’s “extramarital
adventures” revealed during their divorce proceedings.153 Although
the couple was well known—the Florida Supreme Court referred to
the Firestone divorce as a “cause celebre”—the U.S. Supreme Court
held the divorcee was not a public figure for the limited purpose of
her divorce.154 “Dissolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings is not the sort of ‘public controversy’ referred to in Gertz, even
though the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may
be of interest to some portion of the reading public,” the Court
wrote.155 Although the couple was publicly known for its wealth,
Ms. Firestone did not freely choose to publicize issues regarding her
married life.156 Because she did not thrust her divorce into public
controversy, the Sullivan standard did not apply to defamation about
her divorce.157
2. FREE SPEECH VALUE
Defamation is unprotected speech if the defamatory false statements are made negligently for private figures, or with actual malice
for public figures, because the free speech benefits of allowing the
speech are outweighed by the harm it causes.
a. Marketplace of Ideas
Although false statements are not in themselves an unprotected
category of speech, the Supreme Court has stated: “there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.”158 Neither intentional
152

Id. at 351.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 452 (1976).
154
See id. at 454–55.
155
Id. at 454.
156
Id.
157
See id.
158
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). Contra Greenawalt,
supra note 28 and accompanying text (“Under this theory, false ideas are useful
because by challenging true ideas, they encourage re-examination of the truth,
strengthening and vitalizing the truth.”).
153
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nor unintentional lies contribute to society’s interest in “‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.”159 Because
they are not an “essential part of any exposition of ideas,” lies do
not provide new ideas in the marketplace worthy of contemplation,
consideration, or debate.160 Furthermore, untrue statements create a
risk that the “‘stream of information’ will be ‘polluted’ by falsity.”161 Even if false facts add some slight value to the marketplace
of ideas—i.e., through helping discern the truth by causing true
ideas to be re-examined in light of contradicting false ones162—
when false statements are also defamatory, the harm caused to the
victim outweighs this minimal contribution to the marketplace.
b. Participatory Democracy
Defamation targeting private individuals does not contribute to
participatory democracy because it is not about public officials, who
receive less free speech protection than private officials.163 For public officials, defamation is only unprotected speech if it is made with
actual malice.164 Defamatory statements made with actual malice do
not contribute to participatory democracy because, although they
may be about political candidates, they are false—and therefore
would actually create a less informed electorate, rather than a more
informed one. There is also less concern about chilling speech that
advances participatory democracy if the speaker is only held liable
when he or she knows that his or her statement is false.165

159

Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
Id.; see also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2557 (2012) (Alito,
J., dissenting) (“[L]ies have no value in and of themselves, and proscribing them
does not chill any valuable speech.”).
161
Langvardt, supra note 136, at 903; see also Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2559
(Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that allowing people to falsely represent themselves
as receiving a medal of honor from the military “debase[s] the distinctive honor
of military awards” by damaging the reputation and meaning of the award for
those who rightfully earn it).
162
See Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 130; see also discussion supra Section
I.A.
163
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281–82 (1964).
164
Id. at 279–80.
165
See id. at 281–82.
160
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If the defamation targets a limited public purpose figure, the
speech is only unprotected if it is about issues the figure is not famous for.166 This speech makes little contribution to participatory
democracy because if it is not about the issues for which the figure
is famous, it likely does not relate to the public affairs in which they
are involved.167
c. Individual Autonomy
Because defamatory statements are false, they have little value
towards advancing self-expression.168 Moreover, even if there is
some self-expressive value for the speaker, it hinders the autonomy
of the subject of the defamatory statement.169 Whereas the speaker
is arguably expressing a point of view regarding another individual,
the defamed person now loses the ability to control his or her reputation, the way he or she is perceived, and what information is publicized regarding his or her character.170
3. HARM
While defamation makes little contribution to the marketplace
of ideas, participatory democracy, or autonomy, it inflicts great
harm on the person who is defamed. The harms caused by defamation include both individual and community harms. Individualized
harms include the “impairment of reputation and standing in the
community, as well as personal humiliation, and mental anguish and
suffering.”171 In essence, reputation is protected at the expense of
free speech so that “good men [won’t] fall prey to foul rumor”172—
166

See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454–55 (1976).
See id. at 453–54.
168
See Corbin, supra note 23, at 971. False statements do not strongly advance
self-expression because the goal of self-expression is to better understand oneself—to “affront the individual’s worth and dignity.” See id. (quoting Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring)). Spreading lies
about others does not help develop a better understanding of oneself because lies
are not a true expression of one’s inner worth. See id.
169
See discussion infra Section III.B.3. (discussing harms caused by defamation, including harm to individuals’ reputations and standing in the community).
170
See id.
171
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 367 (1974).
172
Russell L. Weaver & David F. Partlett, Defamation, Free Speech, and
Democratic Governance, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 57, 57 (2005-2006).
167
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and have to endure the subsequent psychological, emotional, and
economic consequences from damage to one’s reputation.
Harm caused by defamation extends beyond these personal
harms, also encompassing harm from the community.173 This harm
“stems from the community’s changed impressions of the defamed
person.”174 The defamatory statement harms the reputation of the
defamed individual so severely as to “lower him or her in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating
or dealing with him or her.”175 In addition to further causing psychological harm, damage to reputation can have tangible, economic
costs for the defamed person. The harm to the person’s reputation
may lead to him or her losing a job or having difficulty being hired
for future jobs, causing severe economic damage. Thus, the “concrete reality of what happens” to those who are defamed is that
“[t]heir lives are changed. Their standing in the community, their
opportunities, their self-worth, their free enjoyment of life is limited.”176
C.

Child Pornography

1. DEFINITION
Child pornography, defined as pornographic materials featuring
sexual conduct by children, is not protected speech under the First
Amendment.177 For example, in New York v. Ferber, a New York
statute prohibiting a person from knowingly distributing materials
depicting sexual acts by a child under 16 years of age was upheld,
finding the ban consistent with the First Amendment.178
In defining the contours of this unprotected category of speech,
the Ferber Court held that first, the defendant must have knowledge

173

Daniel Scardino, Liberty and Defamation, 20-FALL COMM. LAW. 3, 3
(2002).
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2376 (1989).
177
Liu, supra note 73, at 2.
178
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982).
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of the character of the materials in order to be prosecuted for distributing them.179 Second, the Court must conduct an independent constitutional review of child pornography found by lower courts to be
unprotected speech.180 However, to be unprotected speech, child
pornography is not required to “appeal to the prurient interest,” “be
patently offensive,” or be “based on a consideration of the material
as a whole.”181 Thus, “the presence of some serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific matter will not constitutionally redeem material containing depictions of sexual conduct by children.”182
The category, however, does not extend to include sexually explicit images that appear to depict minors, but were produced without using any actual children, i.e., through computer imaging.183
Banning virtual images of children “‘goes beyond [Ferber], which
distinguished child pornography from other sexually explicit speech
because of the State’s interest in protecting the children exploited by
the production process.’”184 Thus, such images are protected speech,
if no real children are depicted.185 Still, the requirements to fall into
the unprotected category are minimal: all one needs to prove is that
the material contains images of actual children engaged in sexual
activity, the conduct is illegal by statute, and the defendant was
aware of the character of the materials.186
2. FREE SPEECH VALUE
As the Supreme Court wrote in Ferber, “[t]he value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children
engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de
minimus.”187
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Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber,
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Liu, supra note 73, at 32–33.
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Codifying, supra note 179, at 296.
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a. Marketplace of Ideas
Child pornography makes minimal contribution to the marketplace of ideas because it is not communicating a fact or opinion beyond the sexualization of children, which has little, if any, public
social value.188 It is “unlikely that visual depictions of children performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals would often
constitute an important and necessary part of a literary performance
or scientific or educational work.”189 Moreover, in the rare case
where child pornography is being used to express a literary or artistic idea, there are alternatives that can be used to express the message, such as a person over the statutory age who looks younger190
or virtual simulations of children that are not actually children.191
In addition, whatever viewpoint is expressed through child pornography is not constitutionally protected because freedom of
speech does not extend to illegal activities.192 Because child pornography both features and likely perpetuates illegal abuse of children,
it does not express an idea that legitimately contributes to the marketplace.193
b. Participatory Democracy
Child pornography does not advance participatory democracy
because it does not relate to public officials (given that public officials are adults), public affairs, or matters of public interest. On the
contrary, the Supreme Court in Ferber reasoned that a “democratic
society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens.”194 Because
child pornography has been deemed unprotected speech, states can
pass legislation banning it to protect the “physical and emotional
well-being of youth.”195 By promoting the safety and wellbeing of
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See id. at 762–63.
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Id. at 763.
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See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239–40, 256 (2002).
192
See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–62.
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See Liu, supra note 73, at 7.
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Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168
(1944)).
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children, states can thereby foster future adult citizens who can engage actively in their communities, contributing to participatory democracy.196
c. Individual Autonomy
While child pornography may marginally promote the autonomy
of creators or distributors of child porn by allowing them to express
themselves through this medium, it infringes on the autonomy of the
children in the films in several ways. First, because the children are
subjected to sexual acts, their autonomy over their own bodies is
diminished.197 Second, being featured in child porn hinders their
ability to express themselves, both as children and as adults, because
the images will likely follow them through adulthood, affecting how
they are perceived and interact with others permanently.198 Third, it
affects their self-determination because they are too young to legally
consent to sexual activity, and thus they are not making their own
life decisions regarding whether or not to be featured in the film or
photographs.199
3. HARM
Even if child pornography has marginal free speech benefits in
regards to promoting the autonomy of the creator of child porn, that
benefit is outweighed by the severe harms of protecting child pornography as free speech. Child pornography causes both direct harm
to the children who are the subject of the material and indirect harm
to all children more generally.200
The direct harm caused by child pornography is the injury inflicted on the actual children in the pornographic materials: harm to
their psychological, physical, mental, and emotional wellbeing.201
While these harms are inflicted from the making of the child porn
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See id. at 759.
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itself, which involves sexual abuse of the children, they are compounded by the fact that the materials produced are a “permanent
record of the children’s participation,” and the harms are “exacerbated by their circulation.”202 The permanence of the films suggests
that they will continue to play a role in the children’s lives as they
become adults, potentially preventing them from obtaining certain
jobs or from being able to control their public image or reputation
in adulthood.
The indirect harm resulting from child pornography is the potential harm it causes to all children because child pornography is
often a “catalyst for pedophiles to exploit and abuse children” in the
future.203 The advertisement, distribution, and circulation of child
pornography fuel the market for child porn, promoting the subsequent infliction of harm on more children.204 As the Court in Ferber
wrote, “the most expeditious if not the only practical method of law
enforcement may be to dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product.”205
IV. REVENGE PORN AS A NEW UNPROTECTED CATEGORY
A.
Definition
The category of unprotected speech for nonconsensual pornography must be specifically defined in order to best balance society’s
competing interests in protecting free speech and in protecting victims of nonconsensual porn.206 Although adult pornography generally is protected speech,207 the nonconsensual nature of revenge porn
202

Id.; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
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Although some revenge porn laws go too far in infringing upon speech, see
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speech should be unprotected so that narrowly tailored regulations can be enacted
in order to prevent victims from the severe harms caused by nonconsensual pornography.
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makes it rise to the same level of offensiveness as child porn: because it is nonconsensual, distributing revenge porn inflicts greater
harm on victims than consensual pornography, outweighing its marginal free speech value. Thus, if pornography is distributed or publicized without consent, it should be considered unprotected speech.
The unprotected category of speech for revenge porn should encompass both types of non-consent: images that are initially obtained without consent (e.g., by hacking a victim’s cell phone), and
those that are originally obtained with consent, usually within the
context of an intimate relationship, and then distributed to others
without consent (e.g., images given to a sexual partner, who then
distributes them to seek revenge after a break up or divorce).208
There should also be no distinction in this category of speech between public and private figures because, unlike defamation, there
is no risk of chilling legitimate criticism of public officials by outlawing nonconsensual pornography.209
1. CONSENTING TO ONE IS NOT CONSENTING TO ALL
Critics of legislation on nonconsensual pornography often argue
that if the initial sharing of the images was consensual—i.e., if the
images were consensually given to an intimate partner in a trusted
relationship—the victim thereby consented to the distributor later
sharing such images with the world.210 Consent, however, is context-specific.211 In public disclosure of private fact, the plaintiff’s
208

See e.g., Cecil, supra note 6, at 2514–15 (explaining that a hacker stole
half-naked images of Hollie Toups from her cell phone and posted them online
on revenge porn web site); Danielle Keats Citron, ‘Revenge Porn’ Should be a
Crime in U.S., CNN (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/opinion/citron-revenge-porn/ (“Jane” allowed her ex-boyfriend to take nude photos of
her because he promised they would be “for his eyes only”; however, after their
break up, he uploaded the pictures, along with her contact information on the revenge porn site UGotPosted.); Citron & Franks, supra note 7, at 346 (describing
both kinds of nonconsensual pornography).
209
Even if the victim was a politician, and his or her presence in porn was
relevant to the legitimate public interest—i.e., if the politician was a staunch family values advocate—the photographs could be discussed without showing the actual images. Thus, unlike defamation, there is no risk of chilling speech about the
political figure because his or her participation in such images could still be discussed.
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privacy is violated both when the defendant uncovers the private fact
without the plaintiff’s consent, as well as when the plaintiff previously told the defendant the private fact, but did not consent to it
being publicized to others.212 For instance, in Kinsey v. Macur, Kinsey initially told Macur some of the private facts that Macur later
disclosed to others, and some facts Macur discovered on her own.213
Nevertheless, the disclosure of both types of facts was still considered a violation of Kinsey’s privacy; as the court stated, the claim
“is not so much one of total secrecy as it is the right to define one’s
circle of intimacy.”214 The harm does not result from exposure of a
completely secret fact, but rather from not being able to control
when and to whom the fact is disclosed.215
Moreover, in Banks v. King Features Syndicate, Inc., although
the plaintiff consented to her doctors viewing the X-ray of her pelvis
because it fell within the context of their medical relationship, she
did not consent to the doctors’ subsequent distribution of it to newspapers.216 Additionally, even if an individual consents to some of
her sexual acts being made public—i.e., sexual acts with a former
partner, as in Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc.—that
does not mean she consents to other sexual acts being publicized.217
As the court in Michaels wrote, “public exposure of one sexual encounter [does not] forever remove[] a person’s privacy interest in all
subsequent and previous sexual encounters.”218
Much like public disclosure of private fact, nonconsensual pornography is essentially the distribution of a private fact: one’s intimate sexual relations and acts, which were held to constitute a set of
private facts in Michaels.219 Thus, if public disclosure of private fact
allows a privacy violation to be found where the victim consented
to telling the fact to a few people, but did not consent to disclosing
the fact to the public in general, so too should a privacy violation be
found when revenge porn victims consent to sharing the images with
212
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one person, but do not consent to sharing them with the public at
large.
2. NO PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE FIGURE DISTINCTION
The reason for distinguishing between public and private figures
in defamation is to avoid chilling accurate criticism of public figures.220 However, this concern does not apply in the revenge porn
context. Banning nonconsensual pornography would not chill any
criticism of policies or public affairs, as it only limits the nonconsensual distribution of images of sexual acts, not any false defamatory statement like defamation. In addition, part of the reason for
distinguishing between public and private figures in defamation is
that public figures face less harm because they have more access to
effective channels of communication to rebut false facts.221 However, this reason does not apply to revenge porn because the images
are not false facts that can be rebutted: once they are out in the open,
they are permanently on the Internet, essentially creating a permanent record of the individuals’ role in nonconsensual pornography,
much like child pornography.222 Like public disclosure of private
fact, there is no falsity to disprove,223 but rather, a disclosure of intimacy that cannot be undone.
Furthermore, for defamation, individuals may be considered
public figures if they have “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of
the issues involved.”224 This makes them limited purpose public figures, meaning they are only considered public figures for a limited
range of issues connected to those controversies.225 By the very nature of the fact that revenge porn is nonconsensual, it was not intentionally thrust into the public eye by the victim.226
220

See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964).
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
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Even if pornography is within the range of controversies for
which individuals are public, i.e., if they were famous for other sexual acts or had previously been seen nude in other contexts, being
famous for their sexuality does not mean they made themselves public figures for this particular sex act.227 Just as in Michaels, where
the court held that Pamela Anderson Lee’s sex tape was private despite the fact that she was famous in part for her role in previous sex
tapes, being famous for one’s sexuality does not mean consenting to
a particular sex act being publicized.228 Thus, the public-private figure distinction in defamation should not apply to nonconsensual pornography because, unlike banning defamation, banning revenge
porn does not risk chilling political speech.
B.
Free Speech Value
Parallel to public disclosure of private fact, defamation, and
child pornography, nonconsensual pornography has very few free
speech benefits: it only marginally, if at all, contributes to the marketplace of ideas, it does not advance participatory democracy, and
although it may have some slight self-expressive benefit to the distributor, it infringes on the autonomy of the victim. Like each of the
other three categories, the significant harms of revenge porn outweigh any slight free speech value it has, and its harms mirror the
harms long recognized by well-established unprotected classes of
speech.
1. MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
Whether speech is an exposition of ideas does not depend on
whether the materials contain an “implicit ideology,” but instead, on
what the speaker’s purpose is and how the message is communicated.229 Just as fighting words, for instance, are said to harm, rather
than to express an idea,230 nonconsensual pornography is distributed
against nonconsensual pornography, but in such cases, they still are not consenting to the distribution of the actual images. They merely are in the public to discuss the issue, not to have their images disseminated.
227
See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 840–41 (C.D. Cal.
1998).
228
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229
Sunstein, supra note 15, at 607.
230
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to shame, to embarrass, or to seek revenge—not to contribute an
idea to the marketplace.231 As the sponsor of the Florida nonconsensual pornography bill, Representative Tom Goodson said, “there is
no purpose . . . for anyone to do this, other than for harassment, hatred or to hurt people, and it has driven some people to suicide.”232
Moreover, like public disclosure of private fact, nonconsensual
pornography does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas because
it is not of “legitimate public concern,” meaning it is not “newsworthy.”233 Under the California test for newsworthiness, for example,
nonconsensual pornography is not newsworthy because it has minimal social value, encroaches greatly on private affairs, and the victim did not consent to the relevant position of public fame. 234 Furthermore, under the Restatement (Second) of Torts test, it is not of
legitimate public concern because a reasonable person would find
publicizing one’s sexual acts without their consent “so indecent as
to exceed the promulgation of information to which the community
is entitled,”235 as nothing could be more intimate or private.
In addition, like public disclosure of private fact, nonconsensual
pornography generally does not contribute to the discovery of any
truth pertinent to the public interest—artistic, literary, academic, or
political.236 Yet, even in the rare situation in which nonconsensual
pornography might have some artistic, literary, or political value,
similar to child pornography, there are alternative means to achieve
that value. For instance, just as there are alternatives to child pornography, such as using adults who look young or virtual children,237 alternatives here include adult consensual pornography, actors, or virtual simulations depicting nonconsensual pornography.
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2. PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY
Like defamation targeting private individuals, nonconsensual
pornography does not advance participatory democracy because it
does not relate to public affairs or political officials. Even if the victim of nonconsensual pornography is a public figure, unlike defamation, it still does not contribute to “uninhibited, robust, and wideopen debate on public issues”238 because the subject matter of nonconsensual pornography is private. Although the sex tape in
Michaels, for instance, featured public figures, it still did not contribute to participatory democracy because the content of the tape
involved a private matter.239 Even if the content of nonconsensual
pornography “may be of interest to some portion of the . . . public,”
like the divorce in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, private sexual acts are
“not the sort of ‘public controversy’ referred to in Gertz.”240
In cases where nonconsensual pornography may be politically
relevant, such as news on trafficking, art, or discussion of reproductive rights, nonconsensual pornographic images do not need to be
shown in order to advance democracy. For example, although in
Banks, the medical malpractice issue was a legitimate public concern, the image of the intimate details of the plaintiff’s body did not
need to be exposed to the public in order to discuss the medical malpractice problem.241 Likewise, just as in child pornography, there
are alternatives for disseminating nonconsensual pornography, such
as showing only consensual images.242
Moreover, like in Ferber, where the Court reasoned that child
pornography should be unprotected speech because democracy rests
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on the “healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens,”243 so too is democracy advanced by its citizens
feeling safe and secure in their communities.244 If invasions of privacy—such as images of individuals’ private sex lives being published online without their consent, and without recourse—continuously take place, it is unlikely this sense of security will be achieved,
just as if public disclosures of private fact were not prevented.245
3. INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY
Like public disclosure of private fact, defamation, and child pornography, even if nonconsensual pornography contributes marginally to the autonomy of nonconsensual pornography disseminators
by allowing them to express themselves by distributing the pornography, it diminishes the autonomy of victims. Just as public disclosure of private fact hinders plaintiffs’ self-determination because
they are unable to control who has access to information about their
private lives, nonconsensual pornography infringes on self-determination because revenge porn victims cannot control who sees private
images of their bodies.246 Moreover, just as defamatory statements
further hinder victims’ self-determination because they lose the ability to control their reputation and what information is published
about them, nonconsensual pornography prevents victims from being able to control their reputation or make their own decisions regarding whether or not to display their private sex acts.247
In addition to impeding on victims’ self-determination, nonconsensual pornography also hinders self-expression because it impacts
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how victims interact with others by damaging victims’ psychological and emotional wellbeing.248 It also hinders self-expression because it changes how others perceive victims, causing their messages to be interpreted differently.249 Because once nonconsensual
pornography is posted, similar to child pornography, it is permanently on the Internet,250 it will affect how victims interact with others for the foreseeable future.
C.
Harm
Like child pornography, the severe harm caused by nonconsensual pornography can be categorized as direct and indirect harm.251
Direct harm refers to the injury inflicted on the actual individuals in
the nonconsensual pornographic materials.252 Similar to the harms
caused by defamation, these harms can further be classified as individualized harms and harms from the community.253 The former, individualized harm, includes damage to victims’ psychological and
emotional wellbeing.254 The latter, harm from the community, includes the damage to victims’ reputation and standing in the community, and resulting economic loss.255 In contrast, indirect harm
refers to harm inflicted on others who are not featured in the specific
pornographic materials.256 This includes future victims of nonconsensual pornography—which there will be more of if this speech is
protected—and women in general, as revenge porn “affects women
and girls far more frequently than men and boys, and creates far
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more serious consequences for them,”257 thus perpetuating gender
inequality if this speech is protected.258
1. DIRECT HARM
a. Individual Harms: Psychological & Emotional Damage
Just as public disclosure of private fact may cause mental anguish and humiliation because a private detail of one’s life is disclosed without his or her consent,259 the distribution of revenge porn
also can cause severe psychological and emotional harm to victims,
as their intimate sexual acts are publicized without their consent.
According to one study, ninety-three percent of victims said they
suffered “significant emotional distress due to being a victim” of
nonconsensual pornography.260
The psychological harm caused by nonconsensual pornography
stems not just from the invasion of privacy,261 but also from fear of
the consequences of revenge porn: nonconsensual pornography
raises the risk of stalking and physical attack because victims’
names and contact information often appear next to their nude images.262 “In a study of 1,244 individuals, over 50% of victims reported that their naked photos appeared next to their full name and
social network profile; over 20% of victims reported that their email addresses and telephone numbers appeared next to their naked
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photos.”263 Fear that this raises risk of harm is not just paranoia, but
reality: forty-nine percent of victims in a Cyber Civil Rights Initiative study said they have been harassed or stalked online by people
who viewed their material.264 As a result of this risk, many victims
struggle with anxiety, suffer from panic attacks, and fear leaving
their homes, all of which make it difficult to complete their work.265
For instance, Hollie Toups, a thirty-three-year-old teacher’s aide
in Texas, suffered psychological consequences ranging from humiliation to fear when she found several topless photos of herself published on Texxxan.com, posted alongside links to her Facebook and
Twitter accounts, a Google map of her whereabouts, and numerous
comments.266 Although she had taken these photos for an ex-boyfriend nearly ten years ago, a hacker stole them from her phone and
posted them online.267 After a friend called to alert her about the
images, she “was in tears for days.”268 She was afraid to leave her
house, and when she finally did, she was approached multiple times
by men who had seen her photographs online.269 She stated that she
“could not catch [her] breath,” and that she “was on the verge of a
panic attack.”270
Similarly, for over a year after English professor Annmarie Chiarini’s ex-boyfriend auctioned nude images of her on eBay without
her consent, she suffered from panic attacks and severe anxiety.271
She described her experience:
I would wake up at 3[ ]am and check my email, my
Facebook page, eBay, then Google my name, a ritual
I performed three times before I could settle back
down. In September 2011, I was thrown into panic
263
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again after I read an anonymous email alerting me to
an online profile that featured nude pictures of me. I
Googled my name, and there I was, on a porn website. The profile included my full name, the city and
state where I live, the name of the college where I
teach and the campus. There was a solicitation –
HOT FOR TEACHER? WELL, COME GET IT!
The site had been up for 14 days and had been viewed
over 3,000 times.272
Like child pornography, these harms are compounded by the fact
that once online, there is a permanent record of victims’ involvement in nonconsensual pornography, which is often widely circulated, as it was for Chiarini.273 The permanence of Internet posts
makes the risk to victims’ physical wellbeing and the resulting psychological consequences long-lasting, as the risk continues for as
long as the materials are online. Because Chiarini was too scared to
leave her house for a prolonged period of time, her therapist insisted
she go on medical leave from work.274 However, a senior administrator at the college she worked for denied her request for medical
leave, claiming that she “perpetrated the incident.”275 Chiarini
feared for her job and felt that “[b]ecause of the permanence of the
[I]nternet, and lack of legislation, [her] torture was never going to
end.”276 As a result, that night she attempted suicide.277
Although Chiarini fortunately survived her attempted suicide,
the permanence of nonconsensual pornography exacerbated her psychological harm because it instilled the feeling that the humiliation,
pain, and anxiety would never go away.278 The permanence of nonconsensual pornography also exacerbates the community harms
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(discussed below) because long-lasting psychological harm prevents victims from doing their jobs279—as it did for Chiarini.280 In
addition, the permanence of Internet posts increases the chance that
one’s community will discover the existence of the pornography,
which raises the likelihood that victims’ reputations will suffer.
b. Community Harms: Reputation & Economic Loss
Like defamation, the harm caused by nonconsensual pornography encompasses not only individual physical and psychological
harm, but also community harm, which results from the community’s changed impression of the victim.281 Once nonconsensual
pornography is posted, Internet searches of individuals’ names will
often display their naked image or video.282 Thus, victims’ communities will often quickly become aware of their presence in revenge
porn and hold victims in lower esteem or “deter third persons from
associating or dealing with [them].”283
In addition to worsening psychological harms, this change in
reputation can cause severe economic loss. Some victims have been
fired from their jobs for appearing in nude pictures online; others
have been unable to find work at all.284 For instance, an Ohio teacher
was placed on paid leave after a nude photo of her was posted on a
revenge porn web site.285 A government agency fired a woman after
a co-worker distributed a naked picture of her to colleagues.286 Holly
Jacobs, a 29-year-old Florida PhD student, had to legally change her
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name to find relief after her ex-boyfriend leaked sexually explicit
videos and images of her online.287
Economic costs are particularly great because most employers
use the Internet to screen candidates based on their online reputations, searching job applicants’ names on search engines.288 If sexually explicit images of individuals come up,
[r]ecruiters do not contact victims to see if they
posted nude photos of themselves or if someone else
did in violation of their trust. The ‘simple but regrettable truth is that after consulting search results, employers don’t call revenge porn victims to schedule
interviews or to extend offers. Employers do not
want to hire individuals whose search results might
reflect poorly on the employer.289
2. INDIRECT HARM
a. Harm to Future Victims
In Ferber, the Court reasoned that the distribution network for
child pornography must be closed if the production material, which
requires the sexual exploitation of children, is to be effectively controlled.290 Similarly, the distribution of nonconsensual pornography
must also be controlled to reduce demand for this type of pornography. Unlike child pornography, however, revenge porn is often not
distributed for profit, but rather, to embarrass or shame the victim.291
287

Beth Stebner, ‘I’m Tired of Hiding’: Revenge-Porn Victim Speaks Out
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Nevertheless, without finding this speech unprotected, future victims will continue to be harmed by revenge porn.
Moreover, although child pornography promotes illegal activity—child abuse—and nonconsensual pornography does not necessarily involve an illegal act, it may be used as a tool for crimes such
as domestic violence and human trafficking.292 The images themselves are often taken as a result of an abuser’s force, and abusers
often threaten to disclose the images if victims try to escape from
the abusive relationship.293 Thus, allowing nonconsensual pornography—like child pornography—may enable the perpetration of future crimes, inflicting harm on future victims.
b. Harm to Women in General
While men may be victims of nonconsensual pornography, the
vast majority of victims are women.294 Although significant progress has been made toward gender equality, the failure to take issues
that predominantly affect women seriously—such as domestic violence, sexual assault, sexual harassment, and now nonconsensual
pornography—perpetuates unequal treatment of women.295 This is
particularly true where the law recognizes an analogous issue, but
the analogous crime traditionally affects men.
For instance, courts have long recognized the harms resulting
from defamation: it changes victims’ “standing in the community,
their opportunities, their self-worth, [and] their free enjoyment of
life.”296 For courts to see these harms of defamation, “and yet to fail
292

See Citron & Franks, supra note 7, at 351 (“Revenge porn is often a form
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into his grasp.”); Revenge Porn by the Numbers, supra note 260 (“One in ten expartners have threatened that they would expose risqué photos of their ex online
. . . 60 percent of those who threatened to expose intimate photos followed through
on their threats.”).
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Citron & Franks, supra note 7, at 347; Revenge Porn by the Numbers, supra note 260 (stating that ninety percent of revenge porn victims in Cyber Civil
Rights Initiative sample were women).
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to see that the very same things happen to the victims of [revenge
porn], is selective vision.”297 The law is treating like harms unalike:
it is providing a remedy for people facing these harms when they are
caused by an act that historically affects men (defamation), while
leaving no recourse for victims enduring the same harms when the
act predominantly affects women (revenge porn).298 How many
women like Chiarini need to attempt suicide before it becomes clear
that the harm nonconsensual pornography inflicts on women parallels—if not exceeds—the harm defamation inflicts on men? Why is
it that when a man is accused of being a communist, he can bring
suit against the publisher for defaming his character—damaging his
reputation and creating risk of economic loss;299 yet, when a woman
sues a man for publishing nude photos of her on Twitter and sending
them to her employer—causing the same damage to her reputation
and risk of economic loss—her case is automatically dismissed?300
CONCLUSION
Nonconsensual pornography should not be protected speech under the First Amendment because the severe harms—indirect and
especially direct—strongly outweigh the marginal free speech benefits. Although preserving freedom of speech is critical to advancing
the marketplace of ideas, strengthening participatory democracy,
and fostering self-expression and determination, categorization—
treating different forms of speech differently—does not necessarily
undermine these goals.301 As Frederick Schauer has argued, having
fewer, broader categories of unprotected speech is less likely to protect free speech than having more, narrowly defined categories that
297
Cf. id. (comparing defamation to hate speech). While Matsuda is comparing defamation to hate speech, not revenge porn, her idea of selective vision analogously applies to victims of revenge porn.
298
For examples of how the law provides no recourse for revenge porn victims, see discussion supra note 6 and accompanying text.
299
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300
See Oren Yaniv, Judge Dismisses Case Against Brooklyn Man Who Shared
Nude Photos of Girlfriend on His Twitter Account, NY DAILY NEWS (Feb. 19,
2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/revenge-porn-case-putbed-article-1.1620648; see also Donaghue, supra note 6 (discussing the same
New York case).
301
See Codifying, supra note 179, at 314–15.
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are less vague and malleable.302 Thus, creating a new category for
nonconsensual pornography can protect victims from the significant
harms it causes, without diluting an existing category of speech or
infringing upon the core free speech values.
Moreover, finding nonconsensual pornography to be unprotected speech is critical to providing a legal remedy for revenge porn
victims. Without doing so, failure to provide recourse in the law
causes a second injury to victims—”the pain of knowing that the
government provides no remedy, and offers no recognition of the
dehumanizing experience that victims . . . are subjected to.”303 Nonconsensual pornography causes real harm. “When the legal system
offers no redress for that real harm, it perpetuates [it].”304
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See id. at 314 (“[T]he alternatives then are diluting those tests that are valuable precisely because of their strength, or formulating new tests and categories
that leave existing standards strong within their narrower range.”). Thus, rather
than fitting nonconsensual pornography into child pornography, obscenity, or
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